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Abstract 
The free exchange of data between many interconnected nodes in the absence of a central point of control has 
been at the heart of the internet architecture since its inception. For its engineering architects “if the Web was to 
be a universal resource, it had to grow in an unlimited way” thus “its being ‘out of control’ was very important” 
(Berners Lee, Fischetti 1999). Yet, this simple deign choice has had a serious impact on conventional legal 
thinking. This paper highlights the importance of online decentralized architecture as the perfect substantiation 
of the autonomy rational underpinning the right to free speech.  
In doing so the paper analyses the core principles supporting the net’s architecture on their merit to promote 
user autonomy and self-realization through speech. Following the free speech rationale for autonomy, it is 
observed how some simple engineering decisions for an open decentralised communicatory platform can build a 
user-centric ecology for speech. To validate this hypothesis two main architectural choices are examined as to 
the potential they hold for free speech: the principles of Modularity and End-to-End (E2E).  
The paper concludes that in terms of free speech, law and net architecture should be seen as complementing 
factors instead of opposite controlling deities. In this respect, Lessig’s mantra that “Code is Law” is paraphrased 
to read as “Law Encoded”, meaning that the law should strive to maintain the core architectural net values 
promoting human rights, and free speech in particular.  
 
 1. Prologue: On Shaken Trust and the Online Rechtsstaat 
A recurring theme when discussing online policy making at a transnational level is the issue of regaining trust. 
Online trust has been a key term for the EU Commission’s Digital Agenda (Kroes, 2013) while it has also been 
identified as one of the main priorities of the Obama administration in most of Hillary Clinton’s speeches 
(Clinton, 2010; Clinton, 2011). The original disbelief of state interference in the early days of the internet has 
now given way to an absolute lack of trust: this became especially evident after the Snowden revelations about 
the NSA surveillance tactics online (Donohue, 2013). However, the lack of trust as to online policy making is not 
only evident vertically, between the citizen and the state; it stretches to an international level, involving state-to-
state relations. For some states, Snowden has offered a chance to criticise the US and to some extent European 
internet policy making: Russia has offered asylum to Snowden, China has expressed fears over cyber-espionage 
pushing for a UN governance model online while Brazil has accused the US of breaching international law and 
has expressed an interest in facilitating discussions to strengthen internet governance. Trust has also been 
identified as a major challenge for online policy making by ICANN, the internet’s main governing body 
responsible for domain names (Chehadé, 2013). This lack of trust hardly comes as a surprise given the limited 
transparency and accountability of non-state actors that operate as agents indirectly implementing state control 
online in an opaque manner. In an attempt to restore their damaged profile, top tech companies such as Google, 
Apple, Microsoft, Yahoo!, Facebook and AOL have addressed the Senate Judiciary Committee urging for more 
transparency and accountability to rebuild trust online in the aftermath of Snowden. The same companies have 
however been criticised for their non-transparent configuration of their privacy settings (Edwards, 2013), their 
all-encompassing proprietary policies (Elkin-Koren & Salzberger, 2013) and their use of sophisticated 
algorithms to harness masses of data online (Mayer–Schönberger & Cukier, 2013). 
 The intermediation1 of online speech appears to be holding significant ramifications for its legal protection. This 
has unavoidably shaken the user’s trust in the legal mechanism of upholding human rights online. The new 
mediating forces that have joined in with the ability to control online informational flow (Cohen, 2016) are not 
directly bound to any constitutional obligations to uphold free speech. The Ruggie Principles have created a soft 
law of international responsibilities for online corporations to uphold human rights online. However, this cannot 
guarantee full protection for free speech2. The US First Amendment appears to be drafted on the understanding 
that the State is the sole source of any infringements on the right to speak freely; intermediated speech is thus a 
challenging concept calling for a wider interpretation. In Europe, on the other hand, although freedom of 
expression under art 10 ECHR is predominantly understood as a negative right, there seems to be some ground 
for “implied positive obligations”3 applicable to private actors4. However, with regard to the internet, these 
obligations refer to access to the information online and do not include a right to impart information, nor do 
they touch on issues of administering the informational flow5 or the net infrastructure in general. 
                                                 
1 The issue of intermediary liability is discussed here only briefly with a view to give a short overview of the new ecology and challenges for 
free speech in the digital era. The focus of this paper is on examining the free speech jurisprudential values as applied to online architectures; 
as such it does not offer an analysis of intermediary liability, a matter so widely discussed in the literature that could easily be the focal point 
of a separate paper. 
2 In the same vein, the Global Network Initiative is an effort seeking to promote Corporate Social Responsibility and create some general 
guidelines. That being said, this solution is far from guaranteeing full protection for free speech, especially in cases where online companies 
liaise with oppressive regimes to block access to online content. A fuller protection in this respect could be promised by the Global Online 
Freedom Act, introduced in 2013 in the US Congress but not enacted. Under this Act, Internet Companies, operating in “internet restricting” 
countries, would be required to publish details of their policies with regard to human rights (Brown, 2013). 
3 Mostly referred to in the literature as ‘Drittwirkung’ or ‘horizontal effect’ of the ECHR (Clapham 1993). The European legislative framework 
for human rights is only mentioned briefly here as it falls outside the remit of this paper. 
4 Note for example the case of Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy (application no. 38433/09) ([2012] ECHR 974) where it was held 
that “in such a sensitive sector as the audio-visual media, in addition to its negative duty of non-interference the State has a positive 
obligation to put in place an appropriate legislative and administrative framework to guarantee effective pluralism.” Similar ly, in Khurshid 
Mustafa and Tarzibachi v Sweden (2011) 52 EHHR 24, it was found that Sweden had failed to protect the applicant’s right to receive 
information via satellite broadcast. Other cases of horizontal positive obligations under art 10 ECHR (although not directly referring to the 
internet or telecommunications) are Appleby and Others v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 783, Özgür Gündem v Turkey (2011) 31 EHHR 41;  
VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland (2001) 34 EHHR 159; Feuntes Bobo v Spain (2001) 31 EHRR 50 (Mowbray 2004). 
5 “The right to Internet access is considered to be inherent in the right to access information and communication protected by national 
Constitutions, and encompasses the right for each individual to participate in the information society and the obligation for States to 
guarantee access to the Internet for their citizens. It can therefore be inferred for all the general guarantees protecting freedom of 
 At the same time, the current intermediary liability rules preclude any direct state action to enforce free speech 
online; instead, self-regulation of intermediaries is encouraged by the “safe harbour” statutory provisions, which 
grant them immunity from liability for user-generated unlawful content. The EU’s E-Commerce Directive6, 
granting immunity to intermediaries acting as mere conduits or offering hosting and caching services online, 
follows the example set by similar pieces of national legislation introduced in Germany7, France8 and the UK9. 
Safe harbours are generally considered instrumental in constructing an indirect enforcement mechanism of 
censorship through the delegation of certain powers to private corporations paired with a limited scope of 
accountability.10. At the same time though, entrusting online intermediaries with the task of protecting free 
speech -while themselves being under no direct constitutional obligation- runs the risk of limited “substantive 
protection for individual rights and due process” for the users (Brown, 2013). 
Transparency and accountability seem to be key concepts in enforcing the constitutional protection of human 
rights; they are also the driving wheel behind the internet’s growth and sustainability. However, as noted above, 
online intermediaries - acting either as the states’ agents enforcing its policies online or out of personal interest 
to gain revenues - seem to be lacking in both. As a result, the constitutional protection of free speech, limited 
only against state arbitration, seems to be offering limited protection against the challenges posed for free 
expression in the digital era. What is suggested here is that the archetypal design for the internet’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
expression that a right to unhindered internet access should also be recognized.” Yildirim v Turkey, App. no. 3111/10, para. 31 (ECHR, 18 
December 2012). 
6 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, 
in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce), [2000] OJ L 178/1 (henceforth: E-Commerce 
Directive). 
7 Gesetz zur Regelung der Rahmenbedingungen für Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste (Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste-
Gesetz - IuKDG) in der Fassung des Beschlusses des Deutschen Bundestages vom 13. Juni 1997 (BT-Drs. 13/7934 vom 11.06.1997). 
8 Loi n° 2000-719 du 1 août 2000 modifiant la loi n° 86-1067 du 30 septembre 1986 relative à la liberté de communication. 
9 The 1996 Defamation Act’s defence of “innocent dissemination” has often been evoked in cases concerning online distributors of 
defamatory material. E.g. Godfrey v Demon Internet Service [2001] QB 201, Bunt v Tilley & Ors [2006] EWHC 407 (QB). Note however the new 
defense for website operators introduced in Defamation Act 2013 (c.26) para 5, which seems to be overbroad in regarding also moderated 
content hosted online. 
10 A HRC/17/27 (16/05/2011) at paras 38-48, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression. 
 infrastructure can serve as an embodiment of free speech values, enhancing the user’s autonomy and promoting 
thereby free expression.  
The next section turns to the net architecture for answers; we argue that some of the core values underpinning 
the right for free speech are indeed visible in the engineering principles, upon which the net was built. In fact, it 
appears that the architectures of the right to free speech and the internet share a common value underpinning 
both: the respect to individual autonomy. To iterate this point, the following section attempts a legal evaluation 
of the net’s core architectural principles. The remainder of the paper follows a techno-legal approach to 
ultimately conclude that maintaining a user-centric architecture can restore the user’s trust in the online 
Rechtsstaat.  
 
2. Architecture is Politics, Architecture is Law 
In many ways, architecture is believed to have the power to instruct human behaviour. This may occur either 
directly or indirectly. In the case of direct intervention of architecture in human free will, one can think of the 
simple example of walking on a bridge as the only way to cross a river. In this example, architecture evidently 
guides human behaviour and limits free will to the only viable solution; the one provided by architecture. It is 
accepted, though, that architecture can also affect human behaviour indirectly through its communicative 
effects. The design of a building can either be symbolic11 or it can convey general social values12, ruling social 
behaviour in the same manner law does. For example, Foucault’s reading on Bentham’s panopticon 
                                                 
11 For instance, the architecture of Gothic churches being built tall and narrow symbolizes man’s attempts to reach God (Frankl, 2000). 
12 Kesan and Shah, in their paper ‘How Architecture Regulates’, present an excellent analysis of the regulative effects of architecture. Among  
the examples they use, they refer to the architecture of American malls, which is intentionally simplistic as it tends to avoid the employment 
of any specific theme that might involve religion, class or politics (Kesan and Shah, 2006). 
 (Foucault,1977) demonstrates how spatial arrangements can affect human behaviour; architecture can thus be 
seen as an extra-regulatory force, working alongside law.  
In cyberspace, architecture matters and – as will be demonstrated shortly – it has the power to frame online 
behaviour. This of course is hardly a new observation. Put simply by Mitsch Kapor, “architecture is politics” a 
phrase later formalised and subsequently popularised in Lessig’s published work (Lessig, 2006);. It is true that 
people tend to forget that the internet is an artefact (Post, 2009); an artefact designed on some elementary 
“architectural assumptions”, namely its layered structure and the end-to-end structural principle that runs 
through its infrastructure. Their combination accounts for the internet’s unique set-up. In a way they could be 
regarded as constituting the main core of the internet’s architecture; the fundamental principles that aside from 
holding certain significance for its technical infrastructure, also shape the virtual environment and provide 
guidelines for online interaction. Furthermore, these architectural principles have shaped a new ecology for free 
speech online. Most importantly though – as will be argued next – these principles seem to be a central point of 
reference for the lawmaker seeking to regulate free speech online.  
The main thesis underpinning this paper is that the architectural choices supporting internet design should be 
addressed holistically as to the significance they bear for legal enforcement: rather than addressing the net 
architecture as an online ruling deity competing with the rule of law, it is suggested that we focus on the synergy 
between net architecture and law. Returning to the focal point for this paper, free speech, the main objective of 
the paper is to demonstrate how decentralised net architecture can provide a means for promoting free speech 
and thus a sustainable platform for online communications. As a result, decentralisation is more than a simple 
design choice; it provides an ideal environment for free expression to flourish online and as such maintaining an 
open and decentralised net architecture should be considered as both a means and an end to online free speech. 
To understand this better, the next section scrutinises both architectural assumptions which form the basis for 
 the internet’s design: modularity and End-to-End. In what follows next, each principle is described and 
subsequently assessed on the merit of its capacity to promote free speech. 
 
3. Free Speech Values and Net Architectures 
3.1. Modularity and free speech 
The internet’s fundamental mechanism built along the lines of a layered model demystifies and unravels the 
source of its internal balance: a hierarchy of layers that are interlinked yet separate from one another. This 
unique architecture is attributed to the design principle of modularity (Baldwin & Kim, 2000). Stemming from 
early economic theories on decomposability of complex systems, the principle of modularity entails a system’s 
division to its components, the “modules.” Modules are “quasi autonomous subsystems that can be designed 
separately” (Aoki & Haruhiko, 2002) while they can still work together13. 
To this cause, the designer distinguishes two types of information, visible and hidden. Namely, some information 
is visible to all modules in a system and defines the parameters of each module’s interaction with the others, 
while some information remains hidden, i.e. it refers to internal matters of each module and its access is 
restricted to the module’s interface. The visible information constitutes the system’s design rules and is not 
allowed to undergo any change. On the contrary, the module designer is free to experiment and apply alterations 
to the hidden information within each module on the condition that it will abide by the general design rules. This 
easy implementation of design changes at various points within a complex system grants the system plasticity. 
This plasticity in turn reduces the system’s inflexibility and promotes creativity. Regarding personal computers 
                                                 
13 Its theoretical framework lies at the combination of “low coupling – high cohesion”, meaning that components are interconnected loosely, 
while their intra-elements are tightly coherent (van Schewick, 2010) 
 for instance, peripheral devices connected externally (for example printers) or internally (for example a 
modem) to a computer, can develop their design independently of the computer’s design, as long as they adhere 
to the general interface standards (van Schewick, 2010 at 40).  
Layered architecture consists of modules assigned to a number of layers and creates a vertical hierarchy among 
them. This means that each layer contains information about its internal rules that is unavailable to other layers. 
Moreover, each layer can only use the services of lower layers. Therefore, the layered version of modularity that 
is adopted as an architectural design for TCP/IP creates a vertical hierarchy of progressively elaborated layers of 
specialised services. As a result, complexity of the system is reduced, as layers operate in abstraction, without 
having overall knowledge of the way other layers function. Moreover, the possibilities of technical flaws are 
diminished as the implementation occurs gradually at each level after it has been tested (van Schewick, 2010 at 
47-48).   
It can be argued that effectively all layers work by design on a purely operational level; namely, they can neither 
control the flow of information in general nor discriminate the routing of certain types of information. To them, 
all that matters is to perform the tasks they were assigned and pass on the data to the next level; their actions 
cannot transcend their layer’s boundaries and the raw data included in the encapsulated packets they receive is 
of no special importance to them. As a result, not only is it easier to publish information online, but also the 
message becomes independent from its medium, simultaneously allowing broader accessibility and device 
independence (Berners-Lee & Fischetti, 1999). 
The detailed description above highlights the architectural significance of modularity in terms of ascribing 
specific values to handling the information flow. Although an engineering principle, modularity appears to be 
offering great protection from censorship. Data online is routed by transparent layers, each responsible for 
carrying out a procedural task without the ability to discriminate information. Constructed in a layered vertical 
 hierarchy, internet infrastructure is marked by the integrity of its layers. Each performs a separate task and does 
not interfere with other layers. By employing the design of modularity on a layered infrastructure, the Internet 
becomes a truly neutral decentralised communications platform built on open architectural standards of 
separate transparent layers that route information regardless of its content.  
This feature of modularity seems to reflect the principle of content neutrality in the United States’ First 
Amendment (Stone, 1983). By applying strict scrutiny on content-based restrictions of speech, the First 
Amendment has sought to establish that the marketplace of ideas cannot be manipulated to put certain 
messages across. As the US Supreme court has noted in Mosley: “above all else, the First Amendment means that 
Government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content.”14 Modularity seems to have the same effect, at least in principle, which applies to both state and non-
state mandated restrictions. Equality of speech regardless of its content, which is at the heart of the First 
Amendment (Karst, 1975), is now also possible online; the engineering principle of modularity seems to be 
encoding the legal doctrine of content neutrality online15.  
3.2. The End-to-End Principle and free speech 
The layered model of TCP/IP Protocol is an architectural design based on normative engineering principles, the 
most important of which is the “End-to-End” principle. Solum and Chung describe the End-to-End as “a guiding 
normative principle that clarifies, articulates and illuminates the implicit design principle inherent to layers 
model of the TCP/IP.” (Solum & Chung, 2004).  Initially presented as a design principle in the 1981 paper “End-
to-End Arguments in System Design” by MIT researchers Saltzer, Reed and Clark, it “may be viewed as part of a 
                                                 
14 Police Dp’t v Mosley, 408 US 92, 95 (1972). 
15 This is not to suggest that all content online cannot be restricted based on its content. Filtering or blocking using specific keywords can still 
restrict speech based on its content in a subtle indirect manner. This paper simply highlights the fact that the net architecture by design 
seems to agree with the First Amendment on many accounts. What matters here is the capacity net architecture has for this, not the many 
ways in which the net architecture can be used to restrict speech and facilitate different interests. 
 set of rational principles for organizing such layered systems” (Saltzer et al, 1984). The End-to-End principle 
suggests the following basic design: keeping the network simple while placing its intelligence at its ends. 
Namely, the network should only be endowed with the task of efficiently transmitting datagrams; “everything 
else should be done at the fringes” (Carpenter, 1996). In short, the principle can be summarised in the 
dichotomy “stupid networks”16 and “smart applications”. Initially, the question that was examined in the paper 
introducing the End-to-End principle was where the application level functions should be built; in the centre of 
the network (low level implementation) or at its ends, the application level (higher level implementation)? The 
answer, according to Saltzer, Reed and Clark, was that “the function in question can completely and correctly be 
implemented only with the knowledge and help of the application standing at the endpoints of the 
communications system” (Saltzer et al, 1984  at 279). One example is the function of the file transfer application 
that ensures the delivery of uncorrupted data. Although the check for any errors in data delivery could be 
performed at the lower level of the network communication system, it is better to place this function at the 
higher level of application as the lower layer may lack all the necessary information to fully perform the 
required function. On the contrary, the application level has the knowledge and ability to check for corrupted 
files, just before these reach the user and not while they are still being routed in the network (Solum & Chung, 
2004). In this way, the possibility of data being corrupted is minimised and its integrity is guaranteed. 
This initial thought quickly evolved into a broad architectural statement about what belongs to the network 
level (including the network, transport and application levels) and what should be edge-oriented; left 
completely to the user himself to install, configure, upgrade and maintain (Blumenthal & Clark, 2001). The 
adopted approach was that applications should follow the End-to-End principle so as to survive partial network 
failures. 
                                                 
16 The term is coined by David Isenberg in his paper “The Dawn of the Stupid Network” and has been broadly used for the descript ion of the 
End-to-End principle (Isenberg, 1998).   
 As a result, End-to-End makes the network flexible and enables it to work with all sorts of data, or as Lessig 
eloquently puts it, “End-to-End codes a kind of neutrality” (Lessig, 2000) to the network. In this way, the internet 
maintains a flexibility in its design as all users can contribute to its architecture. Platform configuration depends 
on the user’s ability to create and implement additional software; control over its architecture “becomes 
separable from network ownership”, granting end users the “non-discriminatory ability to design the 
architecture of a communication platform” aside from those who own and control its infrastructure (Bar & 
Sandvig, 2000). Consequently, competitiveness is increased, as neutrality towards data nurtures creativity and 
experimentation.  
In the absence of a hierarchical entity that could discriminate against certain types of applications while 
favouring others, innovators were given the opportunity to directly test the appeal their applications have to 
users (Lemley & Lessig, 2000 at 931-933). Moreover, the cost for innovation has dropped significantly as there 
is no need to configure settings in all layers for its implementation, but simply to invest in the application layer. 
Innovators can therefore demonstrate their work easily and consumers can try new applications at a marginal 
cost or for free without depending on their network administrator for permission (Solum & Chung, 2004). 
According to the MIT research group that formalised the End-to-End principle, it was this specific architectural 
design that enabled experimentation and led to protocols supporting the WWW or even the flexibility in the 
wide interconnection of millions of ISPs online (Reed et al., 1998). It is because of End-to-End that innovation 
online became a decentralised commons, administered at a low cost by anyone that had an internet connection.  
This architectural design realises the main ambitions and goals of the researchers that created the internet: the 
common sharing of resources on an open interlinked platform. Moreover, it shapes online culture as well; a 
culture of users that freely build, share, transform and develop all sorts of information regardless of its content 
online.  
 Above all, the End-to-End principle encodes online one of the main First Amendment concepts: “active listening” 
(Grimmelmann, 2014). This term describes the communicative process envisioned in the First Amendment as a 
bilateral dialogue: the speaker has the autonomy to disseminate information and the listener retains the 
freedom of avoiding unwanted speech that violates his integrity. Online, the listener is not passive but is actively 
seeking information with the added ability to filter or block unwanted speech: this is possible primarily due to 
the End-to-End principle. Intermediaries can certainly cut in the way of this direct interactive communication 
online; however, by design, the internet facilitates this interactive dialogue respecting the choices and autonomy 
of both sides. 
 
4. Law Encoded: Autonomy as an embedded value 
The Internet’s layered structure, built on the principles of modularity and End-to-End, accounts for its general 
open design. In the words of Mitch Kapor, co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation: “It is an open 
network of networks, not a single unitary network, but an ensemble of interconnected systems which operate on 
the basis of multiple implementations of accepted, non-proprietary protocols, standards and interfaces”17. In 
this respect, the architectural principles running through the Internet’s design provide a remarkable mechanism 
that implements and promotes the free speech values enshrined in the constitution. Put simply, Lessig’s axiom 
that “Code is Law” can further translate to “Law Encoded” since the net architecture appears to embrace certain 
First Amendment doctrines.  
Taking this last point a step further, maintaining distributed architectures should be perceived not only as a 
useful means of preserving the internet’s sustainability, but also as a constitutional imperative for the policy 
                                                 
17 M Kapor, ‘EFF’s Extended Guide to the Internet’ at https://www.eff.org/Net_culture/Net_info/EFF_Net_Guide/EEGTTI_HTML/eeg_4.html., 
accessed 20/10/2015. 
 maker. It has been suggested time and again that the current legal framework protecting free speech is not fully 
functional online; many have gone as far as to ask for an online bill of rights. Yet, what has changed is not the 
right to free speech, nor its legal underpinnings, but the circumstances. The rapid centralisation of the net 
architecture and the high concentration levels of intermediaries have made it impossible for the state to 
guarantee constitutional protection for the right to free speech online. Moreover, the focus altogether has shifted 
from architectures promoting free speech to architectures restricting it. Unfortunately, online policy making 
sees only one part of this picture; it describes a negative aspect of the right to free speech inasmuch as it 
protects expression from state mandated restrictions. It has been observed that content blocking and filtering 
can serve many purposes, ranging from national security to online safety and social or moral reasoning. In most 
cases, the right to free speech is restricted when it is found to be clashing with other rights; most notable 
examples online include privacy and intellectual property.  
However, there seems to be a growing demand for a positive right to online free speech, which does not oppose 
but complements online privacy and intellectual property. This is reflected in the latest reports by Frank La Rue, 
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion: In his landmark report on 
technologies of surveillance18, La Rue refers to privacy and free speech online as being interlinked and explicitly 
mentions the state’s obligation to promote these rights and to hold the private sector accountable for any 
                                                 
18 “76. States' human rights obligations require that they not only respect and promote the rights to freedom of expression and privacy, but 
protect individuals from violations of human rights perpetrated by corporate actors. In addition, States should exercise adequate oversight in 
order to meet their international human rights obligations when they contract with, or legislate for, corporate actors where there may be an 
impact upon the enjoyment of human rights. Human rights obligations in this regard apply when corporate actors are operating abroad. 
       77. States must ensure that the private sector is able to carry out its functions independently in a manner that promotes individuals’ human 
rights. At the same time, corporate actors cannot be allowed to participate in activities that infringe upon human rights, and States have a 
responsibility to hold companies accountable in this regard.” A/HRC/23/40 (17 April 2013) 
 infringements. This echoes his own 2011 report, where he further adds that the state’s duty to respect human 
rights is complemented by corporate responsibility born by commercial entities online19. 
Legal theorists have long debated over whether the right to free speech should be interpreted in a pragmatic 
manner20, beyond the strict confinements of the traditional “hand-off” approach that only precludes state 
interference. Unlike other fundamental human rights, free speech maintains a very wide scope of any expressive 
means of communication able to convey a certain message. As a result, not only is it challenging to define the 
protective scope of this right in order to understand its procedural values, but free speech further presents us 
with an oxymoron: its conceptual elements include substantive aspects of this right, such as censorship (Fish, 
2002 at 200). As such, to accurately define the contours of free speech, one must readily accept that all 
constraints imposed on communication are in fact a precondition of expression; censorship is therefore 
indicative of types of speech meriting protection, ascribing a categorical value to speech (Schauer, 1998 at 160). 
In this vein, free speech principles are premised on the acceptance of the wider concept of liberty (Alexander & 
Horton, 1983 at 1356): the ability to freely communicate is thus commensurate with our understanding of 
liberty, regardless of whether speech is seen from a consequentialist or merely ideological point of view. It 
therefore becomes clear that free speech is not to be merely asserted by identifying acts violating this right 
(hands-off approach); on the contrary, expression can be as free as we allow it to be: the positive capacity to act 
upon one’s free will is determined by the presence of measures that nurture liberty rather than the absence of 
restrictions to it (Berlin, 1969 at 121-122). 
                                                 
19 “45. While States are the duty-bearers for human rights, private actors and business enterprises also have a responsibility to respect human 
rights. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur highlights the framework of “Protect, Respect and Remedy” which has been developed by the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. The 
framework rests on three pillars: (a) the duty of the State to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business enterprises, 
through appropriate policies, regulation and adjudication; (b) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, which means that business 
enterprises should act with due diligence to avoid infringing the rights of others and to address adverse impacts with which they are involved; 
and (c) the need for greater access by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and non-judicial.” A/HRC/17/27.  
20 Barendt calls for a pragmatic approach to free speech, citing Haig v Canada (1993 2SCR 995, paras 68-77), where the Supreme Court of 
Canada recognized that positive measures should be adopted by the State to make the right to free speech meaningful (Barendt, 2005 at 107). 
 Having established the significance of a positivist/pragmatic approach for the right to free speech, one can 
further see its value for online communications. Serving as a communicatory platform that can reach a wide 
audience and has a lower participatory threshold than traditional media outlets, the internet holds a key role as an 
enabler of free speech. As such, it is a means of communication, whose control yields great power in terms of exerting 
one’s influence at a global scale. As Castells (2011) notes “ideas are processed in society according to how they are 
represented in the realm of communication. And ultimately these ideas reach the constituencies of each network 
depending on the constituencies’ level of exposure to the processes of communication. Thus, the control of (or 
the influence on) the networks of communication, and the ability to create an effective process of 
communication and persuasion along the lines that favor the projects of the would-be programmers are the key 
assets in the ability to program each network. In other words, the process of communication in society, as well 
as the organizations and networks that enact this process of communication, are the key fields where 
programming projects are formed and where constituencies are built for these projects. They are the fields of 
power in the network society.” 
The internet’s quality as an enabler of free speech is also well illustrated in a number of recent internet related 
cases that have been of major public concern and have mobilised civil society on a global scale: the WikiLeaks 
revelations, the NSA/PRISM spying scandal and the mass protests against SOPA and PIPA, although seemingly 
regarding rights other than free speech, such as privacy and intellectual property, all highlight the need for a 
positive right of free speech online and demonstrate the importance of controlling the online informational flow. 
The need for a pragmatic approach that strives to promote free speech online has not gone unnoticed by the 
policymaker, especially given the existence of many corporations acting as info-mediaries. Advocacy groups 
have highlighted the need for a more proactive constitutional protection regarding free speech online. Take for 
example the recent Facebook decision to take down the iconic image of a naked young girl running away in tears 
after a Napalm bombing in Vietnam. The post, originally shared online by a Norwegian author, was deemed 
 inappropriate by Facebook due to nudity, which clashed with their community standards and was thus removed. 
Article 19’s response (2016) focused on 3 main suggestions: (i) limited 3rd party intermediary liability, following 
the Manila Principles, (ii) Respect for international free speech standards in the Terms and Conditions of online 
giant corporations, like Facebook, and (iii) Clarity and transparency in how decisions to take down content are 
being met. Such suggested measures, however, focus more on the imposed restrictions on data flow and less on 
enabling the user to express freely online. As such, they address the issue of online free speech through 
intermediation, accepting a prima facie centralised architecture online that is in need of regulation. However, 
this approach seeks free speech protection through proxies, resulting in a regulatory system that can easily 
succumb to paternalism by proxy, which is in charge of providing for the “public interest”. Moreover, the 
absence of due process and the opacity that characterises automated decisions to take down online content pose 
serious concerns as to the legitimacy of intermediaries controlling speech online. Not only is this reflected on the 
erosion of public trust online, but it further creates an environment where free speech is dependent on the 
restrictive mechanisms created by the level of liability borne by the intermediary. However, this is far from what 
is put forth in this paper, namely a pragmatic approach that focuses on the positive concept of free speech 
online, harnessing net design principles of E2E and modularity. It is suggested here that a nuanced techno-legal 
approach should be developed that focuses more on the internet’s architecture and less on its status of “online 
market” managed by a handful of commercial entities.  
 
5. Towards a Free Speech Policy Model Based on Decentralised Net Architecture 
As noted in the introduction of this paper, the issue of eroded trust online seems to be the main challenge for 
constructing an online policy model. The general distrust towards the state following the Snowden revelations 
reflects well the general scepticism about the efficacy of the legal mechanism protecting free speech when 
 applied online. On the other hand, the user equally distrusts private actors acting as online intermediaries due to 
their unaccountability. The rule of law seems to be in a non-dialectic relationship with the rules of the market. 
Could a public law policy model for free speech, based on decentralised architecture, reconcile these two fields?  
This is certainly not the first time the literature discusses how code and law can shape online activity and 
influence each other. Joel Reidenberg has been among the first to discuss “Lex Informatica”, namely how the 
network technology, could be used as a tool to “effectively formulate information policy rules” (Reidenberg, 
1997 at 584). Lessig, on the other hand, has been more pessimistic in finding that the code has replaced law 
online21, while Shapiro has noted the quest between state and non-state actors to gain control over the code 
(Shapiro, 1999). This paper has suggested that the truth does not entirely rest with any of these propositions. 
While all of them make some important valid points and have greatly influenced internet policy making and 
online governance, they all seem to adopt a technologically deterministic view. It is argued here that that the net 
infrastructure - although it can be controlled to shape online activity - has also the capacity to promote the 
values protected in law. In other words, the set of architectural values embedded in a chosen design, upon which 
the internet has been built, can serve an instrumental purpose inasmuch they construct an environment, where 
values enshrined in law can flourish: free speech is a great example in this respect. 
Building on previous work by Niva Elkin-Koren and Barbara van Schewick, who have both noted the importance 
of the net infrastructure for online economic discourse, this paper suggests a similar argument for online free 
speech: a dialectic relationship between technology and free speech jurisprudence. Instead of examining 
technology as an exogenous ruling modality, it is suggested that technology ought to be perceived as an 
endogenous force, which can drive policy making models that apply online. Elkin-Koren and Salzberger offer an 
excellent account of how technology should become endogenous to the economic analysis of the internet: 
                                                 
21 “We are no more ready for this revolution than the Soviets were ready for theirs. We, like (the Soviets), have been caught by a revolution. 
But we, unlike them, have something to lose.” (Lessig, 1999 at 234). 
 “The introduction of new technologies has a dialectic relationship with other processes. Legal rules and market 
processes may directly affect the types of technologies available by explicitly prohibiting the use of certain 
technologies by law or by providing certain incentives to particular technologies and not others (...) Technology 
should, therefore, become endogenous to the analysis, and the economic discourse should be expanded to 
address it” (Elkin-Koren & Salzberger, 2004 at 106).       
Thus, the code is not understood here as an inimical ontology: the focus is not on it being a means of control, nor 
on the fact that as a hybrid modality it can shape online behaviour, but on how one can reinforce the other. Of 
course, net architects were not at all preoccupied with the First Amendment or the legal underpinnings of free 
speech and communications. Yet, at the same time, this architectural design of an open access decentralised 
network generating abundance “eliminates one of the key First Amendment diversity difficulties found in mass 
media” (Berman & Weitzner, 1995 at 1624) and holds the capacity to fully promote free speech. This, however, 
does not mean that free speech is guaranteed online and that net architecture is a reliable mechanism that can 
outpace constitutional protection.  
At the time of writing, we stand at a crossroads: On one hand, there are those administering the code pointing 
the finger at the state for infringing on the user’s rights. On the other hand, ICANN has been criticised for lacking 
legitimacy in taking important decisions affecting the user’s rights. In the meantime, the market and the norms 
act as equalising forces. In the middle there is the user, Lessig’s “pathetic dot”, who has lost trust in both sides 
and does not seem to be easily swayed by either of the two; law or the code. Yet, as noted earlier, both law and 
code are only tools, which if utilised properly, can promote free speech in the digital era. Most importantly, it 
should be understood that Lessig’s “pathetic” dot is not pathetic at all (Murray, 2008; Murray 2007): autonomy, 
as the underpinning value of both the free speech and the net architecture, should be at the centre of online 
policy making.  
 In building an open decentralised network, the internet architects have brought communication and the user to 
the forefront, unlike other media. In return, the networked have given their consent to the main architectural 
values as they have consented to the rule of law. Online networks can be controlled, however legitimacy is the 
added parameter that contributes to their effectiveness (Murray, 2011). Furthermore, law in cyberspace is 
based on voluntary obedience and does not operate on the basis of enforcement (C Reed, 2012). In this respect, 
one should consider how the rule of law and the “rule of the code” both exert forms of power based on users’ 
consent: for Law, this consent is reflected in the Constitution. For Code, consent is nurtured by the architecture. 
In both cases, consent is implied further by the mere fact of users’ participation, and their anticipation that the 
values underpinning both the Law and the Code shall remain intact. On the contrary, when administrative 
decisions affect these values, consent is withdrawn and trust online is eroded. It is therefore in identifying the 
common ground in these two modalities (with a focus on substance and not on their administration) that 
consent can be reaffirmed.  
Of course architecture, as law, is a dynamic field. Both can change and evolve over time. In free speech 
jurisprudence, changes are introduced through courts; although the underpinning rationales remain the same, 
their doctrinal interpretation does not and it should not be a static matter. In the same way, computer 
engineering has provisions for change in the form of “designing for tussle” (Clark et al, 2005); technologists take 
advantage of the deliberately flexible design to experiment with different policies and architectures that 
contribute better to the internet’s sustainability. One such example is IPv6: an amendment to the Internet 
Protocol (IP) replacing the previous regime of IPv4 to tackle the problem of address exhaustion (Deering & 
 Hinden, 1998).  In this sense, to suggest that free speech should try to catch up with net architecture22 and 
influence its design would be an arduous and unnecessary task.  
This paper does not suggest a stubborn preservation of internet architecture as such, speaking on strict 
formalistic terms. Instead, we argue that free speech jurisprudence, insofar as it is underpinned by autonomy, 
should guarantee that the internet’s design keeps promoting the autonomy of its users and their ability to make 
informed choices themselves. For this to be sustainable, there needs to be not only a will on behalf of the net 
engineers, but also correct structural policies on behalf of the lawmaker. As Yoo notes, the technical evolution is 
characterised by an ambiguity as far as its outcome is concerned (Yoo, 2012). This uncertainty should also be 
embraced by the lawmaker (Murray, 2007), who needs to liaise with the technologists and allow them the 
necessary space to experiment on better designing the internet of the future.   
The internet architecture has long been a field of constant struggle for control (DeNardis, 2013).  Yet, online 
policy making and the overall debate on online governance seem to be focusing more on the modalities seeking 
to influence the architecture and less on the actual values threatened from changes to the infrastructure. As a 
result, the internet’s architecture has changed to enable better governmental and market regulation23. In Jewel 
v NSA, the EFF explained to the court the unconstitutional NSA spying techniques to search great numbers of 
data by installing fiber-optic splitters on the internet backbone24. Exploiting the architecture to control the user 
and to monitor his activity is gradually becoming the norm online. It is time that Lessig’s (non-pathetic) dot 
should be at the heart of online policy-making and be recognised as an active part instead of merely a controlled 
                                                 
22 Unfortunately, the classic legal approach in law is to evaluate a new technology on the grounds of its relationship with the existing 
constitutional standards. In this sense – contrary to what is argued here – the lawmaker tries to match the online policies to the offline word 
in a revisionist manner, trying “to understand the power of the new in the context of the old.” (Price, 2001 at 1904). 
23 “Just as architecture is changing to better enable government regulation, so too is architecture changed to make the Net more like real 
space – more like real space, but threatening to regulate even more than real space. Better, more efficient regulation through code than the 
regulation effected in real space through code and contract.” (Lessig, 2000 at 997) 
24 Plaintiffs Jewel, Knutzen and Walton’s motion for partial summary judgment, at https://www.eff.org/document/plaintiffs-jewel-knutzen-
and-waltons-motion-partial-summary-judgment 
 subject. Its autonomy online should be guaranteed in order to make informed choices; the First Amendment can 
still be a valuable tool in this respect, provided that it acknowledges distributed architecture as a means of 
promoting the user’s autonomy. 
About the author 
Dr Argyro P Karanasiou is a Senior Lecturer IT & Media Law at the Centre for Intellectual Property Policy & 
Management (CIPPM), Bournemouth University and a Visiting Research Fellow at the Information & Society 
Project Centre (ISP), Yale Law School. 
 
E-mail:  akaranasiou@bournemouth.ac.uk 
Acknowledgements 
I wish to thank Francesca Musiani and Cécile Méadel for all their support and hard work put into this publication 
as well as the anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback. The usual disclaimer applies. 
References 
Andrew Clapham, 1993. “The ‘Drittwirkung’ of the Convention” in R St J Macdonald, F Matscher ,H Petzold (eds) 
The European System for the Protection of Human Rights. Dordrecht; Boston: Nijhoff.  
Andrew Murray, 2007. The Regulation of Cyberspace: Control in the Online Environment. UK:Routledge-
Cavendish. 
Andrew Murray, 2008. “Symbiotic Regulation”, The John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law, 
Volume 26, Number 2, pp.207-228.  
Andrew Murray, 2011. “Nodes and Gravity in Virtual Space” Legisprudence, Volume 5, Number 2, pp. 195-221. 
Andrew Shapiro, 1999. The Control Revolution: How the Internet is Putting People in Charge and Changing the 
World We Know. US: Public Affairs. 
Article 19, 2016. ‘Facebook vs Norway: Learning how to protect freedom of expression in the face of social 
media giants’ at https://www.article19.org/join-the-debate.php/251/view/ , accessed 25/09/2016. 
 Barbara van Schewick, 2010. Internet Architecture and Innovation. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.  
Brian Carpenter, (ed) 1996. “Network Working Group Request for Comments 1958: Architectural Principles of 
the Internet” at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1958, accessed 12 December 2013. 
Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2000. Design Rules: The Power of Modularity. Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, 
pp. 63-92. 
Chris Reed, 2012. Making Laws for Cyberspace, Oxford University Press. 
Christopher S. Yoo, 2012. The Dynamic Internet: How Technology, Users, and Businesses are transforming the 
Network, US: Rowman & Littlefield. 
David D. Clark, John Wroclawski, Karen R. Sollins and Robert Braden, 2005. “Tussle in Cyberspace: Defining 
Tomorrow’s Internet”, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, volume 13, number 3, pp 462-475. 
David Isenberg, 1998. “The Dawn of the Stupid Network” Networker, Volume 2, Number 1, pp. 24-31.   
David Post, 2009. In Search of Jefferson's Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace Oxford University Press 
David Reed et al, 1998. “Commentaries on Active Networking and End-to-End Arguments” IEEE Network, 
Volume 12, pp. 66-71. 
Eric Barendt, 2005. Freedom of Speech. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 107. 
François Bar and Christian Sandvig, 2000. “Rules from Truth: Communication Policy after Convergence,” In: 
Proceedings of the 28th Telecommunications Policy Research Conference (TPRC) on Communication, Information 
and Internet Policy, Alexandria, Virginia, USA. 
Frederick Schauer, 1998 ‘The Ontology of Censorship’ in Robert Post (ed) Censorship and Silencing: Practises of 
Cultural Regulation. Los Angeles, CA: Getty Pub.  
Geoffrey Stone, 1983 “Content Regulation and the First Amendment” WL & Mary L Rev 189, Volume 25, pp. 1-
207. 
Henrik Essunger, 2002. “Stoic Listeners-Speech Harms and the First Amendment”, JL & Soc. Change, Volume 6, 
Issue 1, pp. 55- 70. 
Hillary Clinton, 2010. “Remarks on Internet Freedom” at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm, accessed 12 December 2013.  
Hillary Clinton, 2011 “Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices and Challenges in a Networked World” at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm, accessed 12 December 2013. 
Ian Brown, 2013. “The Global Online Freedom Act,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, volume 14, 
number 1, pp. 153-160. 
Isaiah Berlin, 1969. “Two Concepts of Liberty”, in I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, London: OUP. 
 James Grimmelmann, 2014. “Speech Engines”, Minnesota Law Review, Volume 94, pp. 868-952. 
Jay P. Kesan and Rajiv Shah, 2006. “Setting Software Defaults: Perspectives from Law, Computer Science and 
Behavioral Economics” Notre Dame L Rev. Volume 82, Issue 2, pp. 583-634. 
Jerome Saltzer, David Reed, David Clark, 1984. “End-to-End Arguments in System Design” ACM Transactions in 
Computer Systems Volume 2, Issue 4, pp. 277-288. 
Jerry Berman and Daniel J. Weitzner, 1995. “Abundance and User Control: Renewing the Democratic Heart of the 
First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media” Yale L J, Volume 104, pp. 1619-1637. 
Joel Reidenberg, 1997. “Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology”, Tex. 
L. Rev. Volume 76, pp. 553-593. 
Julie E. Cohen, 2016. “The Regulatory State in the Information Age” Theoretical Inquiries in Law, volume 17, 
number 2, pp.369-414. 
Kenneth Karst, 1975. “Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment” U. Chi. L. Rev. Volume 43, pp. 20-
68. 
Laura DeNardis, 2013. “Internet Points of Control as Global Governance: Paper No2 - Internet Governance 
Papers” Centre for International Governance Innovation) at 
http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2013/8/internet-points-of-control-global-governance, accessed 12 
December 2015. 
Laura Donohue, 2013. “Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations”, Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y, Volume 27, p. 757-900. 
Lawrence Alexander and Paul Horton, 1983. “The Responsibility of a Free Speech Principle” Nw. U. L. Rev., 
volume 78, pp.1319 -1357. 
Lawrence Lessig, 1999. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, New York: Basic Books. 
Lawrence Lessig, 2000. “Symposium: Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm?” Stanford L Rev, Volume 
52, Number 5, p. 987-1002. 
Lawrence Lessig, 2001. “The Architecture of Innovation” Duke LJ, Volume 51, pp. 1783-1801. 
Lawrence Lessig, 2006. Code: Version 2.0. New York: Basic Books. 
Lawrence Solum and Minn Chung, 2004. “The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law” Notre Dame L 
Rev, Volume 79, Issue 3, pp. 815-948. 
Lilian Edwards, 2013. “Privacy, Law, Code and Social Networking Sites” in I Brown (ed) Research Handbook on 
Governance of the Internet, Oxford: University of Oxford.  
Manuel Castells, 2011. ‘A Network Theory of Power’, International Journal of Communications 5, pp. 773-787. 
 Marjory Blumenthal and David Clark, 2001.  “Rethinking the Design of the Internet: The End-to-End Arguments 
vs. The Brave New World”, ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT), volume 1, number 1, pp. 70-109. 
Mark Lemley, Lawrence Lessig, 2000. “The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the 
Broadband Era”, UCLA L. Rev. Volume 48, pp. 925-988. 
Masahiko Aoki and Ando Haruhiko, 2004. “Modularity: The Nature of New Industrial Architecture” RIETI 
Economic Policy Review, volume 4, pp. 218-221. 
Michel Foucault, 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison. New York: Pantheon Books.       
Monroe Price, 2001. ‘The Newness of New Technology’ Cardozo L Rev Volume 22, pp. 1885-1913. 
Neelie Kroess, 2013. ‘How We Are Boosting Trust in the Cloud Post PRISM’ at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/kroes/en/blog/trust-cloud-prism, accessed 12 December 2013.  
Niva Elkin-Koren and Eli Salzberger, 2004. Law, Economics and Cyberspace: The Effects of Cyberspace on the 
Economic Analysis of Law. Cheltenham; Northampton,MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.  
Niva Elkin-Koren and Eli Salzberger, 2013. The Law and Economics of Intellectual Property in the Digital Age: The 
Limits of Analysis. Oxon: Routledge. 
Paul Frankl, 2000. Gothic Architecture. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, A HRC/17/27 (16/05/2011) at paras 38-48. 
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with Guiding Principles in the Annex (UN-Doc. 
A/HRC/17/31) of 21 March 2011, endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council on 6 July 2011 (UN-Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/17/4). 
Stephen Deering and Robert Hinden, 1998. “RFC 2460, Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification” at 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2460.txt, accessed 12 December 2015. 
Tim Berners-Lee and Mark Fischetti, 1999. Weaving the Web: The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the 
World Wide Web by its Inventor. San Francisco: Harper Collins Pub. Inc., p. 181. 
Viktor Mayer – Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, 2013. Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, 
Work and Think. Canada: Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
